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Perhaps at no other time is the conflict between administrative agencies and
courts placed in starker terms than in instances of nonacquiescence. In general,
nonacquiescence refers to an agency's refusal to follow a U.S. court of appeals
precedent in subsequent factually similar cases arising within ("intracircuit")
or outside ("intercircuit") the circuit which produced the adverse ruling. A
nonacquiescence policy reflects a tension between an agency's mandate to
achieve uniformity and expediency in its administrative adjudications and the
court's obligation to safeguard equally the rights of litigants and nonlitigants.
These basic issues have been the subject of considerable academic' and legisla-
tive2 attention. To date, however, there has been no examination in academic
circles of the policy and practice of nonacquiescence by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS" or the "Service").
Such an explication is warranted for three reasons. First, as suggested
above, scarce resource allocation and fundamental fairness are competing
interests in nonacquiescence. Such concerns intensify where administrative
agencies face heavy adjudicative burdens; the sheer number of actual and
potential litigants ensures that nonacquiescence will impact many lives.'
During fiscal year 1990, some 87 immigration judges adjudicated 105,768 of
the 112,314 deportation cases received, 13,795 of the 14,633 exclusion cases
t Student, Yale Law School. B.A. 1989, University of Washington; J.D. expected 1992, Yale Law
School.
1. See, e.g., Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown
of the Rule of Law: A Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801 (1990); Samuel Estreicher
& Richard L. Revesz, The Uneasy CaseAgainstIntracircuitNonacquiescence:A Reply, 99 YALE L.J. 831
(1990) [hereinafter Estreicher & Revesz, Reply]; Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence
by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989) [hereinafter Estreicher & Revesz, Federal
Agencies]; Deborah Maranville, Nonacquiescence: Outlaw Agencies, Imperial Courts, and the Perils of
Pluralism, 39 VAND. L. REV. 471 (1986); Burt Neuborne, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court
Precedents, 61 TUL. L. REV. 991 (1986); Joshua 1. Schwartz, Nonacquiescence, Crowell v. Benson, and
Administrative Adjudication, 77 GEO. L.J. 1815 (1989); Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Agency Non-Acquiescence-
Respectful Lawlessness or Legitimate Disagreement?, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 845 (1987); Efrat M. Cogan,
Note, Executive Nonacquiescence: Problems of Statutory Interpretation and Separation of Powers, 60 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1143 (1987); Note, Collateral Estoppel and Nonacquiescence: Precluding Government
Relitigation in the Pursuit of Litigant Equality, 99 HARV. L. REV. 847 (1986); Christopher C. Taintor,
Note, Federal Agency Nonacquiescence: Defining and Enforcing Constitutional Limitations on Bad Faith
Agency Adjudication, 38 ME. L. REV. 185 (1986).
2. See infra part IV. See generally, Carolyn A. Kubitshek, Social Security Administration Nonacqui-
escence: Need For Legislative Curbs on Agency Discretion, 50 U. PrrT. L. REV. 399 (1989).
3. See, e.g., Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1436-38 (9th Cir. 1983) (Social Security
Administration's rejection of circuit court precedent will result in thousands of claimants being denied
benefits to which the court has previously held they are entitled).
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received and 2,737 of the 2,823 motions to reopen received.4 These figures
total to 122,300 completed adjudications in 1990, at a rate of 5.4 per day per
immigration judge.5 Where justice is applied on such a truly massive scale,
the impact of an agency policy to disregard circuit precedent is clearly
far-ranging.
The second reason to examine nonacquiescence in immigration law is that,
compared to most administrative decisionmaking, the interests implicated in
immigration adjudications tend to be particularly fundamental. While a Social
Security Administration (SSA) case might involve questions of eligibility for
certain benefits,6 the everyday deportation or exclusion adjudication puts the
most basic liberties at stake. An alien who is forcibly deported loses not only
access to U.S. government services, but also the fundamental rights and
privileges enjoyed by those residing in this country. As Justice Brandeis noted,
the devastating consequences of a deportation order may deprive a person of
"all that makes life worth living. "' Therefore, a litigant's access to any poten-
tially favorable circuit precedent is especially urgent.
Finally, the courts traditionally have been reluctant to scrutinize admin-
istrative decisionmaking in the immigration context. This deference has
primarily been the result of a statutory framework which entrusts immigration
functions to the executive branch. For example, immigration statutes have long
declared that the decisions of executive branch officers in deportation and
exclusion cases "shall be final,"8 and did not explicitly provide for judicial
review until 1961.9 Where courts have exercised jurisdiction to review immi-
gration cases, the review has been highly deferential to administrative agency
discretion." Even today, the Supreme Court explicitly warns courts of ap-
peals against second-guessing administrative discretion." In light of this
4. Executive Office of Immigration Review Statistical Summary For Fiscal Year 1990 (on file at
EOIR).
5. In comparison, the 55 U.S. District Court judges in the Second Circuit completed 696 criminal
trials during 1990 for an average of 12.65 criminal trials per year per judge. 1990 U.S. COURTS FOR THE
SECOND CiRcuIT REP. 13.
6. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-33 (Supp. V 1987) (SSA disability benefits program).
7. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). The Supreme Court has also acknowledged that
deportation is "the equivalent of banishment." Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637,642 (1954) (quoting Fong
Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)).
8. See generally Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 233-35 (1953) (quoting Immigration Act § 8, 26
Stat. 1085 (1991)). This somewhat remarkable directive continues to exist in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1988)
(in all cases of deportation, "the decision of the Attorney General shall be final") and 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)
(1988) ("the decision of a special inquiry officer shall be final unless reversed on appeal to the Attorney
General").
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (Supp. V 1987), as amended by § 5, Act of Sept. 26, 1961, P.L. 87-301, 75
Stat. 651.
10. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972);
Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Flemming v. Nestor,
363 U.S. 603 (1960).
11. See, e.g., INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 452 (1985) ("[I]t is not for the judiciary to usurp
Congress' grant of authority to the Attorney General by applying what approximates de novo appellate
review."); INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144 (1981) ("ITihe Court of Appeals improvidently
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historical relationship, understanding the extent to which the INS adheres to
judicial precedent is especially important; the balance of power between court
and agency is directly at issue.' 2
Part I will outline the basic framework under which immigration cases are
resolved, describe a recent policy statement prepared by the INS for the
Author, and discuss in greater detail the competing interests involved in INS
nonacquiescence."3 Next, part II will review reported decisions of the Board
of Immigration Appeals (the "Board") and the U.S. courts of appeals. Particu-
lar attention will be focussed on instances of nonacquiescence which suggest
an underlying INS program of nonacquiescence. Last, part III will examine
the most recent legislative responses to administrative agency nonacquiescence
that balance the needs and obligations of administrative justice against the ideal
of the rule of law. 4
Before proceeding, it will be useful to identify in concrete terms the impact
that a nonacquiescence policy may have on individual litigants. For example,
both Maldonado-Cruz v. U. S. Department of Immigration and Naturalization 5
and Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office for Immigration6 involved claims
for political asylum by Salvadoran aliens who had deserted guerrilla groups
in what they contended was an expression of political neutrality. These aliens
argued that by statute, their neutrality amounted to a political opinion which
formed the basis for a well-founded fear of persecution if they were forced to
return.' 7 The Board rejected these arguments in both cases, thereby denying
asylum and leaving the aliens with no other option but to appeal to the court
encroached on the authority which the [Immigration and Nationality] Act confers on the Attorney General
and his delegates.") Butsee Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 73 (1984) ("The courts' almost complete deference to Congress and the immigration authorities, long
a keystone of the classical structure, is beginning to give way to a new understanding and rhetoric of
judicial role, as unusual in immigration cases as it is now commonplace in other domains of public law.")
(footnote omitted); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990) (arguing that the so-called
"plenary power" doctrine, which vests exclusive immigration authority in Congress and the executive
branch, is undermined by courts through statutory interpretation); McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, 111
S.Ct. 888 (1991) (holding that district court has federal question jurisdiction to hear constitutional and
statutory challenges to INS procedures governing "Special Agricultural Workers" application program).
12. In other words, the degree to which the courts are able to constrain administrative discretion is
presented in dramatic terms when an agency challenges its obligation to abide by a precedent in a particular
case.
13. Although the terms "nonacquiescence" and "to nonacquiesce" may be somewhat cumbersome and
ambiguous for the reader, they are terms of art employed in the relevant literature, see supra note 1, and
hence are used throughout this Article.
14. By "rule of law," this Article simply refers to the general notion that ours is a society governed
by laws which are applied not as a matter of discretion but as a matter of principle.
15. 883 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1989).
16. 894 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1990).
17. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988) provides the Attorney General discretion to grant political asylum where
the alien has met the definition of "refugee" under 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42)(A) (1988), which requires proof
of persecution on account of "race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion."
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of appeals."5 In Maldonado-Cruz, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that political neutrality did constitute a political opinion and
reversed the contrary Board decision. t9 Conversely, Perlera-Escobar, an
Eleventh Circuit case decided less than six months after Maldonado-Cruz, not
only declined to adopt the Ninth Circuit rule, but also expressly favored the
Board decision as "persuasive."2' Subsequent decisions from the First and
Fourth Circuits have refused to follow the Ninth Circuit's statutory inter-
pretation."
From this basic fact pattern, any number of possibilities could arise in
future litigation, depending on the nonacquiescence policy adopted. If an alien
in similar circumstances later applied for asylum in the Ninth Circuit, the
administrative decisionmaker could engage in intracircuit nonacquiescence by
applying the Eleventh Circuit rule and thus deny the alien the benefit of the
Maldonado-Cruz precedent. Alternatively, if the case arose in the Second
Circuit, the decisionmaker could opt for intercircuit nonacquiescence and
choose to apply the Ninth Circuit rule over the Eleventh Circuit rule, or vice
versa, or apply the rule of the First, Fourth, or Xth Circuit. Finally, regardless
of the circuit in which a case arose, a decision could be made to acquiesce
nationwide to one circuit's view, essentially ignoring any contrary interpreta-
tions. Thus, deciding which nonacquiescence policy to apply in immigration
law is not an academic exercise but instead a determination that has a direct
impact on thousands of individuals litigating immigration claims. 2
I. INS POLICY ON NONACQUIESCENCE
A. The Statutory and Regulatory Framework
Immigration adjudications are handled both within the INS, by district
directors, and in the independently established Executive Office of Immigration
Review ("EOIR"), 2 by immigration judges. District directors generally
adjudicate more mundane disputes,24 while the primary responsibility of
18. The appellate review procedure is discussed infra part I.A.
19. 883 F.2d at 791.
20. 894 F.2d at 1297 n. 4.
21. See Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 6 n. 4 (st Cir. 1990); Cruz-Lopez v. INS, 802 F.2d
1518, 1520 n. 3 (4th Cir. 1986).
22. The existence of venue choice provisions, discussed infra at text accompanying notes 28-32,
complicates matters further.
23. The EOIR was established in 1983 as an independent adjudicatory body within the Justice
Department and made accountable only to the Associate Attorney General. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1, 3, 100
(1991) and 28 C.F.R. § 0 (1990). The Board was created by administrative regulations, not by statute.
See 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.0-3.8 (1991).
24. For instance, district directors decide applications for the extension of tourist visas, for a change
of schools by student visa-holders, for adjustment of status from resident alien to lawful permanent resident,
and for visa petitions based on family relationship. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A.
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immigration judges is to make the more substantial and consequential deporta-
tion and exclusion decisions.25 Appellate jurisdiction over these adjudications
may be had by either the EOIR's Board of Immigration Appeals, or the INS'
Associate Commissioner for Examinations. While the Board tends to review
the decisions of immigration judges, no easy line of demarcation exists between
the two tribunals.26 Since the Board will typically review the more significant
administrative decisions, this Article will focus solely on the caselaw within
the Board's jurisdiction. The following discussion will examine the appellate
review procedure in the context of an immigration judge's order of deportation.
Regulations grant deportable aliens a right of appeal to the Board.27 Upon
an adverse decision of the Board, a deportable alien may file a petition for
review either in the circuit in which the hearing before the immigration judge
occurred or in the circuit in which the alien resides.2" These jurisdictions will
often be different because of the migration of aliens once they have entered
the country.29 As a result of this "venue choice" provision, the Board can
never be entirely sure which circuit precedent will be applicable in a subse-
quent appeal. Board members generally assume that an appeal will be taken
in the circuit in which the hearing occurred and, to the extent possible, apply
the caselaw of that circuit.3" The Board generally construes circuit precedent
conservatively, preferring to leave the extension of a case's logic to the circuit
court. 1 A number of Board opinions are published as "precedent decisions"
and serve to bind "all officers and employees of the Service or Immigration
Judges in the administration of the [Immigration and Nationality] Act."32
Review by a U.S. court of appeals is limited strictly by statute to the
administrative record, and the Board position is conclusive "if supported by
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record."" The only
remaining avenue of direct review for an unsuccessful alien is by petition for
certiorari to the Supreme Court.34 If the INS is unsuccessful, it too must
MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 84 (1985).
25. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a), 1252(b) (1988).
26. See ALEINIKoFF & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 93 (advising litigants to refer to regulations in order
to make sense of "mystifying" rules of appellate jurisdiction).
27. 8 C.F.R. § 242.21 (1991). In comparison, the right to appeal an exclusion order is statutory. 8
U.S.C. § 1226(b) (Supp. V 1987).
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(2) (Supp. V 1987). For a detailed overview of judicial review procedures,
see 3 CHARLES GORDON & STANLEY MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE Ch. 81 (1991).
29. For instance, Mexican aliens sometimes enter the country illegally through the U.S.-Mexico border
in Texas or New Mexico to work as migrant workers. These workers then follow the harvests wherever
they occur, often picking crops in states as distant as Washington and Florida.
30. Interview with Michael Heilman, Board of Immigration Appeals Member, in New Haven, Conn.
(Apr. 16, 1990) [hereinafter Heilman Interview] ("We generally adjudicate from the point of view of the
deportation hearing's circuit. This makes sense because the immigration judge will be applying that circuit
law. Our general rule is to try to apply the individual twist of the expected reviewing circuit if possible.").
31. Id.
32. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g) (1991).
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) (1977).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2350 (1988).
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consider whether to seek further review of its position. While the ultimate
authority to appeal rests with the Solicitor General," the INS nevertheless
must make the initial determination to appeal. In a letter prepared for this
Author, representing the only available written statement on INS nonacquies-
cence, the INS Acting General Counsel Paul Virtue described the administra-
tive decisionmaking process as one of overlapping discretion:
[Upon receipt of an adverse circuit court decision, the INS General Counsel's
Office] will then consult with agency personnel from the operating unit(s) affected
by the decision. We will inform them of the decision and solicit their views as
to the decision's impact upon their operations. We will also attempt to ascertain
the views and recommendations of the local and regional INS offices under the
jurisdiction of the particular circuit court at issue.
After consulting with the various parties, this office will then prepare a
recommendation on behalf of the INS which is forwarded to the Office of Immi-
gration Litigation. That office prepares its own recommendation which, if adopted,
becomes the recommendation of the Civil Division [of the Justice Department].
The Civil Division's recommendation in turn is forwarded to the Office of the
Solicitor General. If the U.S. Attorney's office has assumed responsibility over
the litigation, that office will also submit a recommendation which is forwarded
to the Solicitor General's office. The Solicitor General's office then makes the
final decision regarding further review of adverse circuit court cases.
In determining whether to pursue certiorari, the INS weighs many factors,
including the precedential effect of a decision, the impact on agency resources,
and the likelihood of success before the Supreme Court.37
When the decision is made not to appeal, or the Solicitor General denies
a request to petition for further review, the question of nonacquiescence arises.
What will be the stance of the INS in comparable, subsequent cases? Will the
INS acquiesce in the circuit decision nationwide, acquiesce within the circuit
producing the unfavorable ruling while preserving its position in other circuits,
or nonacquiesce in all circuits? The INS General Counsel's office provides
35. See Robert L. Stern, The Solicitor General's Office and Administrative Agency Litigation, 46
A.B.A. J. 154 (1960), reprinted in 21 LoY. L.A. L. REV., at 1073, 1075 (1988) ("[No agency can take
a case to the Supreme Court without the Solicitor General's authorization."). See also Eric Schnapper,
Becket at the Bar-The Conflicting Obligations of the Solicitor General, 21 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1187 (1988)
(identifying five distinct responsibilities).
36. Letter from Paul Virtue, Acting General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service, to
Author (Jan. 28, 1991) [hereinafter INS Letter] (on file with Author).
37. Id. Similarly, in Social Security cases, the Government strategy will be to appeal only those cases
with fact patterns most sympathetic to the Government. For example, consider the following statement of
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Carolyn B. Kuhl before the Senate Finance Committee:
[Sen.] Long: Is it not a fact that on some of these cases you just say, well, that's a very poor
situation in which to present this issue? We would like to present it where we think the facts are
more neutral. Doesn't that apply to some of those decisions?
[Ms.] Kuhl: [Ylou are quite correct, Senator, in your suggestion that the Government does to
some extent, at least, pick and choose the cases that we appeal.
Social Security Disability Insurance Program: Hearings on S. 476 Before the Committee on Finance, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 135-36 (1984).
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some insight into these queries. But before continuing, it should be pointed out
that because Board decisions govern agency policy,3" nonacquiescence does
not in fact occur until the Board sanctions it. In other words, the INS may very
well decide to nonacquiesce only to have its position effectively vetoed by the
Board. Therefore, this Article actually explores two phenomena: one where
the INS adopts a posture of nonacquiescence and is rejected by the Board and
the other where the Service and Board concur on a nonacquiescence posi-
tion.3 9
B. INS Statement on Nonacquiescence
Acting General Counsel Paul Virtue has stated that "[t]he INS does not
have a policy of nonacquiescence."'4 That no formal policy statement exists
is not surprising. It is possible for agencies to assume a posture of nonacquies-
cence on a case-by-case basis through agency opinions, briefs and rulings.41
In fact, this ad hoc method of resolving nonacquiescence issues is quite
common among federal agencies and departments. In response to a 1975
inquiry by the Hruska Commission, six governmental bodies responded that
nonacquiescence was considered on a case-by-case basis.42 A 1987 study by
Professors Samuel Estreicher and Richard Revesz for the Administrative
Conference of the United States reached similar conclusions.43
While neither study surveyed practices in immigration law," it appears
that the INS proceeds in a like manner. As Mr. Virtue explained, "[a] decision
to not acquiesce would be made in consultation with the Solicitor General's
office and the Office of Immigration Litigation. "" He added that no written
statements, pronouncements or procedures governed the INS decisionmaking
process." The Office of Immigration Litigation concurred that the process
of consultation is decidedly informal.47
38. See supra text accompanying note 32.
39. See infra text accompanying note 77.
40. INS Letter, supra note 36.
41. See John L. Radder, Note, Agency Nonacquiescence: Implementation, Justification and Accept-
ability 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1233, 1234 (1985).
42. These organizations were the Veterans Administration, Comptroller of the Currency, Customs
Service, Federal Power Commission, Department of the Army, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms. COMM'N ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND
INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, 67 F.R.D. 195, 358-59 (1975) [hereinafter
HRUSKA COMMISSION].
43. See Estreicher & Revesz, Federal Agencies, supra note 1, at 716 (finding that federal agencies
have a "tendency to consider acquiescence in court of appeals rulings on an ad hoc basis").
44. See HRUSKA COMMISSION, supra note 42; Telephone Interview with Samuel Estreicher, Professor,
New York University School of Law (May 4, 1990).
45. INS Letter, supra note 36.
46. Id.
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A practical impetus for maintaining an informal nonacquiescence policy
may be that formal statements evoke the harshest judicial criticism and greatest
academic scrutiny. Because the Social Security Administration (SSA), National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) have, to
varying degrees, explicitly acknowledged a policy of nonacquiescence, courts
and commentators alike have focussed attention on them in particular.48
However, this is not to suggest that a covert approach to nonacquiescence is
any more acceptable or defensible. Instead, as one commentator submits,
"informal nonacquiescence evokes no comment, perhaps because it simply goes
unnoticed."4 Part II will explore in greater detail how this ad hoc nonacqui-
escence is reflected in INS briefs and the decisions of the Board. Before
continuing to that discussion, an overview of the pragmatic and philosophical
factors at issue in INS nonacquiescence is in order.
C. Competing Interests in Nonacquiescence
Nonacquiescence may be categorized as either intercircuit, in which an
agency declines to follow the caselaw of a particular circuit except in cases
arising within that circuit, or intracircuit, in which an agency refuses to follow
the caselaw of a circuit even in cases arising within that circuit. Any discussion
of nonacquiescence must distinguish between intercircuit and intracircuit
nonacquiescence because the degree of acceptance among courts and commen-
tators varies markedly between the two. Virtually all observers agree that
48. For commentary on SSA nonacquiescence, see Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1503 (9th Cir.),
vacated on other grounds, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984); Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1367
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), prelim. inj. vacated sub. nom., Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29, 34-36 (2d Cir. 1986);
Carolyn B. Kuhl, The Social Security Administration's Nonacquiescence Policy, 4 DET. C.L. REV. 913
(1984) (excerpts from a statement delivered before the Senate Finance Committee, Jan. 25, 1984); James
Roy Williams, The Social Security Administration's Policy of Non-acquiescence, 12 N. KY. L. REV. 253
(1985); W. Gordon Dobie, Note, Nonacquiescence: Health and Human Services 'Refusal to Follow Federal
Court Precedent, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 737 (1985); Bernard P. Matthews, Jr., Comment, Social Security
Continuing Disability Reviews and the Practice of Nonacquiescence. 16 CUMB. L. REV. 111 (1985); Ann
Ruben, Note, Social Security Administration in Crisis: Non-Acquiescence and Social Insecurity, 52 BROOK.
L. REV. 89 (1986).
For commentary on NLRB nonacquiescence, see Yellow Taxi Co. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366, 382-83
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 975
(1980); Donald L. Dotson & Charles M. Williams, NLRB v. the Courts: The Need for an Acquiescence
Policy at the NLRB, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 739 (1987); Scott Kafker, Nonacquiescence by the NLRB:
Combat Versus Collaboration, 3 LAB. LAW. 137 (1987); Lynn Paul Mattson, The United States Circuit
Courts and the NLRB: "Stare Decisis" Only Applies If The Agency Wins, 53 OKLA. B.J. 2561 (1982); Lee
Modjeska, The NLRB Litigational Processes: A Response to Chairman Dotson, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
399 (1988); Edward Silver & Joan McAvoy, The National Labor Relations Act at the Crossroads, 56
FoRDHAM L. REV. 181, 199-205 (1987).
For commentary on IRS nonacquiescence, see Keasler v. United States, 766 F.2d 1227, 1233 (8th
Cir. 1985); Gary L. Rodgers, The Commissioner "Does Not Acquiesce," 59 NEB. L. REV. 1001 (1980);
Comment, The Commissioner's Nonacquiescence, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 550 (1967); Edward F. Zwick,
Comment, Treasury Department's Practice of Non-acquiescence to Court Decisions, 28 ALB. L. REV. 274
(1964).
49. Maranville, supra note 1, at 484.
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intercircuit nonacquiescence is consistent with, and even complementary to,
our system of judicial review. 0 This appellate structure rejects intercircuit
stare decisis in favor of a process of intercircuit dialogue.51 Rather than
establishing a nationwide rule whenever a single court of appeals decides an
issue, the courts are free to pursue, and subsequently follow, a "law of the
circuit" until the circuits reach a consensus or the Supreme Court makes a final
decision. Intracircuit nonacquiescence, on the other hand, is a topic of consid-
erable debate.5"
1. Arguments Against INS Intracircuit Nonacquiescence. The most damning
criticism of intracircuit nonacquiescence is the near certainty of grievous
disparities: where agencies refuse to adhere to circuit precedent in subsequent
factually similar cases, the only litigants able to benefit from a favorable prece-
dent are those capable of litigating up to the circuit court.5 3 For the vast
majority of aliens subject to deportation or exclusion, there is neither the
sophistication, money nor time to continue, let alone commence, litigation.54
In one court's words, the result is that "one [litigant] is governed by one legal
standard but his neighbor, lacking in either financial resources, litigational
persistence, or physical or mental stamina, is governed by another. " Critics
argue persuasively that this is precisely what the rule of law is intended to
50. See, e.g., U.S. v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160-63 (1984); SAMUELESTREICHER& JOHN SEXTON,
REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS
48 (1986). But see James C. Riley, Limiting the Impact of Intercircuit Nonacquiescence, JUDGES' J.,
Summer 1990, at 6, 6 (arguing that "only reviewing bodies that are independent of program administration
and adjudication should be empowered to determine when intercircuit nonacquiescence can be applied").
51. See, e.g., IB, JAMES W. MOORE, ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 10.402(1) (2d ed. 1991);
SUP. CT. R. 17(a) (review and certiorari). Four benefits of intercircuit dialogue are identifiable: legal
reasoning of the courts of appeals improves; empirical evidence increases as courts pursue different legal
theories; the Supreme Court is signalled regarding when to grant certiorari; and the experiences of the
courts of appeals aid the Supreme Court in deciding on the merits. See Estreicher & Revesz, Federal
Agencies, supra note 1, at 736-37.
These advantages may be slightly more attenuated in the immigration context because the majority
of immigration-related cases arise in the Ninth and Fifth Circuits. See, e.g., 1989 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK
OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE xliv, 128 (observing that great majority of inspec-
tions and deportations occurred in states under jurisdiction of Ninth and Fifth). Thus, substantial dialogue
occurs only between a limited number of circuits. Conversely, it can be argued that these courts have
become more expert in immigration cases and are therefore better equipped to proceed with meaningful
dialogue.
52. See generally, sources cited supra note 1.
53. See Diller & Morawetz, supra note 1, at 814-15; Michael J. Froehlich, Note, Administrative
Nonacquiescence in Judicial Decisions, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 147, 149 (1984-85).
54. That is, it is reasonable to assume that most aliens will not be aware of applicable caselaw and
even if they are, will not have the resources to proceed through all levels of adjudication. In addition, the
temporal aspect of intracircuit nonacquiescence is distressing. While it is true that the practical goal of
immigration advocacy is often delay, see ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 85-87, aliens who have
been waiting years for a final deportation or exclusion decision are nevertheless psychologically affected.
The knowledge that at some point in the near future they may be forced to leave the U.S. makes assimila-
tion into society immensely difficult.
55. Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), prelim. inj. vacated sub. nom.,
Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986).
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prevent; 56 aliens should not be required to relitigate an issue that has already
been decided in their favor.
A related point is that an alien who is denied the precedential effect of a
previous circuit decision has every incentive to press his claim vigorously. The
alien, or more precisely the alien's attorney, will recognize that beyond the
administrative adjudicatory structure lies a federal court ready to honor the
doctrine of stare decisis. The burden of this phenomenon upon judicial resourc-
es is undeniable.57 Potentially, "[i]f all disappointed parties before the agen-
cies pursued their rights, the courts would be crushed by the burden of adjudi-
cating repetitive identical cases.""
2. Arguments in Favor of INS Intracircuit Nonacquiescence. While blanket
intracircuit nonacquiescence is troublesome, some contend that in a limited
form it may be entirely appropriate,59 offering three primary justifications.
First, intracircuit nonacquiescence, like intercircuit, aids dialogue and hence
the thoughtful and reasoned development of the law.6° Where a circuit has
struck down an INS position and two other circuits have subsequently upheld
the position, conceivably the INS should be permitted to present the original
circuit with an opportunity to reconsider.6 Underlying this argument for
"percolation" is a broader view that administrative agencies and circuit courts
are partners in the development of national law. Until either the Supreme Court
or Congress has spoken definitively, agencies should maintain their view
because "[t]hey are more a part of the policymaking, politically accountable
branches of government than they are part of a system of adjudication."62
Second, the practice of intracircuit nonacquiescence furthers the important
goal of uniformity in the administration of an agency's statutory mandate. By
refusing to acquiesce to a circuit decision, an agency is able to apply the same
56. See, e.g., Diller & Morawetz, supra note 1.
57. Even those who support some limited intracircuit nonacquiescence recognize the burdens upon
the judicial system. See Estreicher & Revesz, Federal Agencies, supra note 1, at 750.
58. Diller & Morawetz, supra note 1, at 817 (citing as example tremendous increase in rate ofjudicial
filings following SSA's adoption of nonacquiescence policy).
59. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1865-72; Estreicher & Revesz, FederalAgencies, supra note
1, at 753-58; William Wade Buzbee, Note, AdministrativeAgency IntracircuitNonacquiescence, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 582, 604-07 (1985).
60. Stephen P. Eichel, Comment, "RespectfulDisagreement": Nonacquiescence By Federal Adminis-
trative Agencies in United States Courts of Appeals Precedents, 18 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 463, 467
(1985).
61. See Estreicher & Revesz, Reply, supra note 1, at 743-44; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1868-72;
Buzbee, supra note 59, at 605-06.
62. Estreicher & Revesz, Reply, supra note 1, at 840. See also, Maranville, supra note 1, at 491
(agency may be under political pressure to reduce program expenditures or to achieve broader goals which
seem incompatible with adhering to particular judicial precedent).
To summarize the legal development argument for nonacquiescence: "[T]he legitimacy of intracircuit
nonacquiescence flows from the congressional choice of administrative government and from the judicial
system's commitment to intercircuit dialogue." Estreicher & Revesz, Reply, supra note 1, at 841.
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standards nationwide and achieve horizontal uniformity.63 Thus, where an INS
position has been rejected by a circuit which hears only a handful of immigra-
tion cases a year, the INS perhaps should not be required to abandon its stance
in that circuit.' Instead, as the INS pursues relitigation in that circuit, or in
other circuits, to create a proper vehicle for Supreme Court review, it could
assure uniform outcomes in the interim.
Forsaking uniformity impacts significantly upon the cost-effectiveness of
agencies whose operations are already constrained by limited budgets. A bar
on intracircuit nonacquiescence would essentially require an agency to have
circuit-specific instructions for administrative judges, as well as circuit-specific
operations manuals and training systems for enforcement officers .65 This
differential administration would be particularly burdensome for the INS. The
immigration regulations governing EOIR and INS officers are voluminous."
Moreover, the thirty-three U.S. district offices of the INS, which are governed
by four regional offices, do not correspond with the geographical jurisdiction
of the courts of appeals. 67 As a result, an immigration judge responsible for
one INS district would often be required to conform to the precedents of more
than one judicial circuit.68
Third, when circuit panels conflict, the law of the circuit is unsettled and
administrative agencies are reasonably justified in maintaining intracircuit
nonacquiescence. This situation occurs occasionally in the Ninth Circuit. For
instance, in claims for asylum and withholding of deportation, panels have
split regarding the Board's policy of automatically denying withholding of
deportation when the less stringent standard required for asylum is not met.
Ninth Circuit panels in Rodriguez-Rivera v. INS and Diaz-Escobar v. INS
agreed that failure to demonstrate a "well-founded fear" of persecution for
asylum purposes meant, afortiori, that an alien had not met the standard of
a "clear probability" of persecution required for withholding of deportation.7'
On the other hand, the panel in Montecino v. INS remanded the case to the
63. Uniformity may be a particularly compelling interest in immigration matters. For instance, it is
inconceivable that Congress intended that an alien's excludability should depend on the fortuity of the circuit
in which he was apprehended or the circuit in which he was given a hearing.
64. Heilman Interview, supra note 30.
65. See Estreicher & Revesz, Federal Agencies, supra note 1, at 748-49.
66. 8 C.F.R. § 1.1-499.1 (1991); Appendix 2 CHARLES GORDON & STANLEY MAILMAN, IMMIGRA-
TION LAW AND PROCEDURE (1991) (INS Operations Instructions).
67. 8 C.F.R. § 100.4 (1991).
68. Similarly, 16 of the NLRB's 33 regional offices straddle 2, 3, and even 4 circuits. See Estreicher
& Revesz, Federal Agencies, supra note 1, at 691 n. 41.
69. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (withholding of deportation); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (asylum). The Ninth Circuit
has interpreted § 1253(h) to entitle an alien to withholding of deportation upon proof of a clear probability
of persecution, and § 1158(a) to permit asylum where an alien proves a well founded fear of persecution.
See Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488, 1491 (9th Cir. 1986); De Valle v. INS, 901 F.2d 787, 790 (9th
Cir. 1990).
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Board for failing to proceed to the question of withholding of deportation after
denying asylum.71 Absent an en banc decision or definitive Supreme Court
ruling, the INS should arguably be allowed to adhere to its own policy in a
circuit with inconsistent interpretations.
Fourth, intracircuit nonacquiescence may simply be an inadvertent conse-
quence of the fact that the INS must take a position before it knows which
circuit will review -its decision. For example, review of a deportation order
may be available in either the First or Second Circuit,72 where the First has
rejected an INS position and the Second has either upheld it or not yet ad-
dressed it. For the agency to maintain its view would amount to intracircuit
nonacquiescence if the First Circuit ultimately hears the case. However, if the
Second Circuit were the eventual venue, to require the INS to abandon its
stance would result in either nonacquiescence or the needless abdication of an
agency position. Thus, in the presence of venue choice, the INS should
perhaps continue to adhere to its position, regardless of the fact that intracircuit
nonacquiescence may subsequently arise.'
To conclude, the controversy over nonacquiescence boils down to a debate
over the competing interests of administrative efficiency and fairness. The
tension between these two goals is encountered throughout immigration law:
how can accurate and humane application of the law be reconciled with the
need to keep a massive bureaucratic structure operating efficiently?74 In the
end, resolution of this conflict requires a choice "between the perspective of
the agency and that of the courts, between rule of law values and bureaucratic
values."7 Part III argues that administrative agencies, courts and Congress
71. 915 F.2d 518, 520 (9th Cir. 1990).
On some subjects, panels have expressed displeasure with the holdings of other panels, leaving the
law of the circuit in doubt. For example, on the question of whether a neutral political opinion qualifies
as a political opinion for asylum purposes, one Ninth Circuit panel criticized, in a disparaging tone, recent
decisions by other panels:
We have held that political neutrality is a political opinion, or in other words, that the absence
of a political opinion is a political opinion. See, e.g., Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1231-32
(9th Cir. 1988); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 1984).... Other
circuits have declined to follow. See, e.g., Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 6 n. 4 (1st Cir.
1990) ("Only the Ninth Circuit clearly has held that neutrality is a political opinion within the
meaning of the Act."); Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office for Immigration, 894 F.2d 1292,
1297-98 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (pointing out that acceptance of neutrality as a political opinion "would
create a sinkhole that would swallow the rule."); Cruz-Lopez v. INS, 802 F.2d 1518, 1520 n.
3 (4th Cir. 1986) (declining to follow the Ninth Circuit rule).
Arriaga-Barrientos v. INS, 925 F.2d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 1991).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
73. See Buzbee, supra note 59, at 604-05, Estreicher & Revesz, Federal Agencies, supra note 1, at
741-43.
74. See ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 561-62.
75. Maranville, supra note 1, at 528. Maranville predicts that this value conflict will remain unresolved
because it has not been solved generally in administrative law. Id. at 528-29. It is well beyond the scope
of this Article to proffer a solution to the basic value'conflict. However, given the particular context of
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are all responsible for reaching an appropriate compromise. Before that, it is
necessary to understand the extent to which the INS does engage in practices
of nonacquiescence.
II. CASELAW SUMMARY
A discussion of the caselaw will serve to illustrate the development of
nonacquiescence issues in immigration law. Given the ad hoc approach taken
by the INS,76 the only method of identifying an instance of nonacquiescence
is to survey decisions of the Board and the courts of appeals for a description
of the INS posture. However, because Board decisions govern the INS,' an
INS decision to nonacquiesce may be denied effect by the Board. Therefore,
the following discussion identifies both occasions in which nonacquiescence
actually occurs by reason of Board approval and occasions in which there is
only an INS position in favor of nonacquiescence. The latter instances, while
not determinative of subsequent immigration law, are nevertheless illustrative
of the INS position on this critical issue of agency-court relations.
A. Intercircuit Nonacquiescence
1. INS Practice. The Service and the Board have been explicit regarding
their prerogative to deny the precedential effect of a particular circuit court
decision in factually comparable cases arising in other circuits. While the
Board has acquiesced nationwide to unfavorable circuit precedents," the usual
approach is to engage in intercircuit nonacquiescence. 9 This practice appears
to have arisen during the 1960s when the Board, faced with hostile district
court opinions,80 asserted its privilege to affirm INS positions in all cases
arising outside of the jurisdictions of those district courts."' For instance, in
Matter of Lim, while agreeing to acquiesce, the Board reasoned:
immigration law, part III explores potential legislative responses.
76. See supra text accompanying note 45-47.
77. See supra text accompanying note 32.
78. For example, in Matter of McMillan, the Board agreed to follow nationwide a Ninth Circuit
decision, Palmer v. Reddy, 622 F.2d 463 (1980), concerning visa preferences for certain stepchildren. 17
I. & N. Dec. 605, 607 (BIA 1981). In making this decision, the Board gave weight to the fact that "[t]he
Government appears to have acquiesced in the Ninth Circuit's interpretation." Id.
79. See cases cited infra notes 85-86.
80. See, e.g., Andrade v. Esperdy, 270 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); In re Yuen Lan Horn, 289
F. Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
81. See, e.g., Matter of Amado and Monteiro, 13 1. & N. Dec. 179, 181 (BIA 1969); Matter of Lim,
13 1. & N. Dec. 169, 170 (BIA 1969). The Board has continued to adhere to this position. See, e.g., Matter
of Moreira, 17 1. & N. Dec. 370, 373 (BIA 1980); Matter of Fakalata, 18 1. & N. Dec. 213, 218 (BIA
1982). Interestingly, in an earlier decision in Matter of Moreira, the INS urged the Board to acquiesce to
the district court decision nationwide. 17 1. & N. Dec. 41, 43-44 (BIA 1979).
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The fact that a lower federal court has rejected a legal conclusion of this Board
does not of itself require us to recede from that conclusion. The Service's jurisdic-
tion is nationwide and we hear appeals from Service decisions in all parts of the
country. The contrary ruling of a reviewing court in one district is not necessarily
dispositive of the issue; a conflicting view may be expressed byoa court in another
jurisdiction.'
This reasoning was expressly adopted later in the context of circuit court
decisions. Thus, in the 1971 case Matter of Yee, the Board quoted the language
of Lim while holding that the INS was not bound to follow a Ninth Circuit
deportation decision" in similar cases in other circuits." A number of other
Board decisions have ruled likewise on a variety of issues.8 5 In practically
equivalent judgments, the Board has also regularly decided to acquiesce to
recent adverse circuit opinions only in those particular circuits, while leaving
the law unsettled elsewhere."
In contemplating intercircuit nonacquiescence, the Board does not consider
the failure of the INS to appeal to be controlling.87 The Board has held that
the absence of appeal of a circuit decision is not indicative of acquiescence
because "[t]he determination not to appeal may be based on other consider-
ations, such as the inadequacy of the record as a vehicle for appeal or factors
outside of the record which render an appeal undesirable." 8 The Board has
not addressed the issue of whether the Solicitor General's refusal to authorize
the INS to petition for certiorari requires the Board to acquiesce nationwide
to the circuit decision. However, if one is convinced by the dialogue argument
for intercircuit nonacquiescence,"9 it follows that the Solicitor General's
82. 13 I. & N. Dec. 169, 170 (BIA 1969) (citations omitted).
83. Lee Fook Chuey v. INS, 439 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1971).
84. 13 I. & N. Dec. 785, 789 (BIA 1971).
85. See, e.g., Matter of Fede, Int. Dec. 3106 (BIA 1989) (attorney's fees pursuant to Equal Access
to Justice Act); Matter of Torres, Int. Dec. 3010 (BIA 1986) (excludability of aliens returning to U.S. on
grant of advanced parole); Matter of Waldei, Int. Dec. 2981 (BIA 1984) (request for hearing by stowaway
seeking asylum); Matter of Santos, Int. Dec. 2969 (BIA 1984) (right to counsel in deportation proceeding);
Matter of Newton, 17 1. & N. Dec. 133, 134-35 (BIA 1979) (lawful domicile requirement for relief from
deportation); Matter of Anwo, 16 1. & N. Dec. 293, 298 (BIA 1977) (lawful domicile requirement for relief
from deportation); Matter of Singh, 13 I. & N. Dec. 439, 442 (BIA 1969) (tolling of statute of limitations
provision governing adjustment of status).
86. In other words, the cases in note 85 involve situations where the Board refuses to follow a
precedent from a circuit that is not expected to review its determination. The following cases, on the other
hand, find the Board requiring acquiescence to a precedent of the expected reviewing circuit while
permitting nonacquiescence elsewhere. As a practical matter the result is the same-intercircuit nonacquies-
cence. See, e.g., Matter of Herrera, 18 I. & N. Dec. 4, 5 (BIA 1981) (physical presence requirement for
relief from deportation); Matter of Patel, 17 I. & N. Dec. 597, 601 (BIA 1980) (exemption from labor
certification); Matter of Bonnette, 17 1. & N. Dec. 587, 588 (BIA 1980) (visa preference for stepchildren);
Matter of Kondo, 17 I. & N. Dec. 330, 330 (BIA 1980) (rescission of adjustment of status for nonviable
marriage); Matter of Cienfuegos, 17 I. & N. Dec. 184, 185-186 (BIA 1979) (defining adultery).
87. See, e.g., Matter of Amado and Monteiro, 13 1. & N. Dec. 179, 181 (BIA 1969); Matter of Lim,
13 1. & N. Dec. 169, 170 (BIA 1969).
88. Matter of Singh, 13 I. & N. Dec. 439, 442 (BIA 1969).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
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refusal to seek review should require acquiescence because a controlling
Supreme Court ruling cannot be forthcoming.
2. Judicial Response. The few judicial comments regarding intercircuit
nonacquiescence in the area of immigration law have been unfailingly support-
ive of the practice. As one court stated:
Even were the INS to acquiesce in an unfavorable judicial interpretation in one
circuit, it would surely not be obliged to do so in other circuits that had not
decided the question. And, of course, an unfavorable ruling in one circuit would
not prevent the INS from continuing to follow its interpretation of the statute in
other cases nationwide."
Undergirding the judiciary's acceptance of INS intercircuit nonacquiescence
is an appreciation of the beneficial effect on legal development afforded by
circuit dialogue. For example, in Matter of Waldei,9" the Board decided to
acquiesce to the Second Circuit decision in Yiu Sing Chun v. Sava9 and in
similar cases arising in the Second Circuit, but to engage in nonacquiescence
elsewhere. Subsequently, in the Second Circuit case Azzouka v. Sava,93 a
majority of the panel denied Judge Friendly the opportunity to reconsider the
previous opinion in Chun. In dissent, Judge Friendly clearly took solace in the
fact that "some other court of appeals will doubtless have an opportunity to
decide the point determined by us in Chun in light of the decision of the Board
of Immigration Appeals not to consider Chun as a controlling precedent outside
of the Second Circuit."
94
The Supreme Court has embraced the practice by the INS for the same
reason. In United States v. Mendoza, a unanimous court reflected that,
"[a]llowing only one final adjudication would deprive this Court of the benefit
it receives from permitting several courts of appeals to explore a difficult
question before this Court grants certiorari." 95
3. Venue Choice Intracircuit Nonacquiescence. It is important to note that
many Board decisions permitting intercircuit nonacquiescence may become
intracircuit in nature as a result of a venue choice provision. The Board's
approach has been to apply the precedent of the circuit in which the case
arises, regardless of where the alien resides.96 As a result, if a liberal venue
90. Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325, 1330-31 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (footnote and citation
omitted), vacated and remanded, 59 U.S.L.W. 3580 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1991). See also Castillo-Felix v. INS,
601 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1979) ("It is elementary that the decisions of one Court of Appeals cannot bind
another. ")
91. Int. Dec. 2981 (BIA 1984).
92. 708 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1983).
93. 777 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1985).
94. Id. at 77 (Friendly, J., concurring in result in part and dissenting in part).
95. 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984). The Court adopted wholeheartedly the dialogue justification for
intercircuit nonacquiescence by stating: "We think our conclusion will better allow thorough development
of legal doctrine by allowing litigation in multiple forums." Id. at 163.
96. See cases cited supra notes 85-86. In deportation cases, the Board assumes venue will be in the
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provision permits appellate review in a circuit other than the circuit contem-
plated by the Board, a conflict may emerge. If the actual reviewing circuit's
caselaw differs from that of the anticipated reviewing circuit, the Board and
Service will thereby end up in a posture of intracircuit nonacquiescence.
An instructive case in point is Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, in which an alien
was apprehended in the Ninth Circuit for illegal possession of a concealed
weapon, transferred to a detention center in the Fifth Circuit for a deportation
hearing, and then released on bond to return to reside in the Ninth Circuit.97
Because the deportation hearing occurred in the Fifth Circuit, the Board
declined to follow relevant Ninth Circuit precedent in its holding that
Maldonado-Cruz was not entitled to political asylum.9" At that stage, a stat-
ute" provided the alien with the option of appealing either in the Ninth Cir-
cuit, whose caselaw favored his position, or in the Fifth Circuit, whose prece-
dents would likely require his deportation. As might be expected,
Maldonado-Cruz chose to appeal to the Ninth Circuit, which then predictably
reversed the Board on the basis of Ninth Circuit caselaw.'t° Though inadver-
tent, the Board had therefore engaged in intracircuit nonacquiescence.' 0 t
In sum, intercircuit nonacquiescence occurs frequently in immigration law
and is regularly upheld by the Board and the courts. Through intercircuit
nonacquiescence, the INS is able to enjoy the benefits of increasing intercircuit
dialogue and maintaining a uniform policy in all circuits which have not
expressly rejected that policy. At times, because of venue choice rules, a Board
decision permitting INS intercircuit nonacquiescence can result in intracircuit
nonacquiescence, the subject of the next part.
B. Intracircuit Nonacquiescence
1. The INS Practice. The Board has permitted the INS to engage in
"intradistrict" nonacquiescence. For example, the Board case of Matter of
Melendez1°2 arose in the jurisdiction of the New Jersey district court which
97. 883 F.2d 788, 789-90 (9th Cir. 1989).
98. Matter of Maldonado-Cruz, Int. Dec. 3041 (BIA 1988).
99. 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(2) (Supp. V 1987).
100. 883 F.2d at 790-93. A similar result was reached in Rios-Berrios v. INS, 776 F.2d 859 (9th Cir.
1985).
101. While there are no statistics available to determine the extent to which aliens engage in forum
shopping through liberal venue provisions, it is at least clear that the right to choose among forums often
creates problems in the administrative law context. See, generally, Note, Venue for Judicial Review of
Administrative Decisions: A New Approach, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (1980). One attorney at a federal
immigration agency, who requested anonymity, explained to this Author that aliens regularly invent a
residence at hearings before the immigration judge in anticipation of appeal and that the government usually
does not challenge the sham for lack of resources. He even suggested, half jokingly, that forum shopping
is so common that a prima facie case for malpractice could be made if an alien's attorney failed to identify
the alien's residence as being located in a circuit with caselaw favorable to the alien.
102. 16 I. & N. Dec. 54 (BIA 1976).
Yale Law & Policy Review
had previously decided Acosta v. Gaffney. 10 3 Despite the fact that the deci-
sion in Acosta clearly bore on the situation in Melendez, the Board ruled that
it was not obliged to follow Acosta." It reasoned that because the INS had
subsequently appealed Acosta to the Third Circuit, the district court's decision
was not dispositive even within its own jurisdiction. 05 Similarly, the Board,
on occasion, has sanctioned INS intracircuit nonacquiescence.
In Matter of Mangabat, the Board once again adopted the language of
Lim" 6 in ruling, contrary to Ninth Circuit decisions, that an alien who en-
tered the United States as a nonimmigrant was not entitled to discretionary
relief from deportation under the applicable statutory provision.' °7 Despite
the fact that Mangabat had arisen in the Ninth Circuit, the Board proffered a
number of justifications for its holding allowing nonacquiescence even in the
Ninth Circuit. The Board first recognized that courts in the Second, Sixth and
Seventh Circuits had endorsed the Board view and that no other circuit had
followed the Ninth. It then continued, "[w]here a reviewing court rejects our
construction of a statute, in treating the same issue in subsequent cases we try
to reach an accommodation compatible both with respect for the court's
judgment and with the needs of effective administration of the law. "18 In
resolving this fundamental conflict, the Board decided to uphold its position
and await consideration by the Supreme Court." 9 Finally, it noted that INS
efforts to petition for certiorari negated any notion of acquiescence." 0
2. Board Denial of INS Nonacquiescence Posture. Since the early-1970s
decisions, like Mangabat, the Board has often declined to follow suggestions
by the INS that it engage in intracircuit nonacquiescence."' While these
opinions ultimately permitted only intercircuit nonacquiescence, they make
103. 413 F. Supp. 827 (D. N.J. 1976), rev'd, 558 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1977).
104. Matter of Melendez, 16 I. & N. 54, 55 (BIA 1976).
105. Id. Instead, the Board ruled that it would retain the doctrine it had previously enunciated in Matter
of Anaya, Int. Dec. 2243 (BIA 1973) and Matter of Lopez, Int. Dec. 2224 (BIA 1973).
106. See supra text accompanying note 82.
107. 14 1. & N. Dec. 75, 77-78 (BIA 1972), referring to 8 U.S.C. § 1251(0.
108. Id. at 77.
109. Id. at 78. The Board stated: "In declining to apply the cited Ninth Circuit decisions in this and
other cases reviewable in that circuit, we mean no disrespect for that court. Since the issues have already
been crystallized, briefed and defined in the cited cases, our action now should pave the way for prompt
decision in that court and prompt review in the Supreme Court." Id. at 76.
110. Id. The Board had originally withheld action because the Solicitor General had authorized the
INS to petition for certiorari in a comparable case and the Supreme Court had granted. Id. at 76. However,
in that case, the alien left the country and so the Court simply remanded with directions to dismiss the
petition for review. INS v. Vitales, 405 U.S. 983 (1972). Rather than continue to withhold action and wait
for a definitive Supreme Court decision to be made, the Board opted to decide Matter of Mangabat. 14
I. & N. Dec. at 76.
A year later, under very similar circumstances, the Board once again sanctioned intracircuit nonacqui-
escence. See Matter of Perez-Echeverria, 14 I. & N. Dec. 347, 348 (BIA 1973).
111. See, e.g., Matter of Gonzalez, 16 I. & N. Dec. 134, 136 (BIA 1977) ("The instant case does
not contain the persuasive factors present in Matter of Mangabar. "); Matter of Bowe, 17 I. & N. Dec. 488,
499-500 (BIA 1980); Matter of Anselmo, Int. Dec. 3105, at 9-11 (BIA 1989).
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clear the willingness of the INS to pursue nonacquiescence nationwide. In
Matter of Anselmo, the INS submitted a brief arguing for nonacquiescence to
a Ninth Circuit en banc decision"' which held that the Equal Access to Jus-
tice Act (EAJA) applied to proceedings before immigration judges and the
Board. It wrote:
mhe Service is in the strongest disagreement with the Court's ruling on the
applicability of EAJA to deportation proceedings and will not comply with the
statement, even in the Ninth Circuit, in order to bring the matter before the
Supreme Court at the earliest possible moment."
3
While the Board agreed substantively with the INS position, it decided to
acquiesce, concluding that the Board had "historically followed a court's
precedent in cases arising in that circuit."14
3. Judicial Attitudes. Perhaps surprisingly, the courts have not been espe-
cially critical of the prospect of INS intracircuit nonacquiescence. "5 In Ayuda
v. Thornburgh, the D.C. Circuit expressly declined to disapprove of intra-
circuit nonacquiescence and even hinted that it might be permissible. It stated:
Whether an agency is required as a matter of law to acquiesce in an unfavorable
ruling when fiiture cases arise in the same circuit court of appeals is a matter of
much debate.... Although some courts have expressed disapproval of intracircuit
nonacquiescence, we have never decided the issue. Even the most vociferous
critics of intracircuit nonacquiescence have conceded the validity of the policy in
at least some instances." 6
The Ninth Circuit, which regularly clashes with the INS over immigration
issues, went a step further in Castillo-Felix v. INS and asserted that the INS
has a right to nonacquiesce intracircuit (though it praised the INS for not
exercising this right). 7 With regard to the Second Circuit decision in Lok
v. INS"" the court stated:
Although the INS could refuse to adopt the Lok interpretation in the Second
Circuit and thereby achieve consistency of application, to do so would only invite
112. Escobar-Ruiz v. INS, 838 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1988).
113. INS Brief, reprinted at 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 900 (Sept. 2, 1988). Interestingly, the INS
technically prevailed in Escobar-Ruiz, because the court, while finding the EAJA applicable to deportation
proceedings, denied fees to the particular alien in the case. 838 F.2d at 1029. As the "winner," the INS
was unable to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court. See 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES at 900.
114. Matter of Anselmo, Int. Dec. 3105, at 10 (1989). The Board noted the "unusual fact setting"
in Matter of Mangabat, described at notes 106-110, to distinguish that case from Matter of Anselmo. Id.
at 11.
115. Compare some of the harsh criticism in sources cited supra note 48. There can be little doubt
that the lack of judicial criticism is in some way a result of the traditional deference courts have displayed
in the immigration context. See supra text accompanying notes 8-11.
116. 880 F.2d 1325, 1330-31 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citations omitted), vacated and remanded, 59
U.S.L.W. 3581 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1991). See also id. at 1334 ("A decision by a court of appeals against an
agency in an individual case does not bind the agency in other circuits, and perhaps not even in other cases
within the same circuit.") (citation omitted). But see id. at 1352 (Wald, J., dissenting) ("The majority can
point to absolutely no evidence whatsoever that Congress in fact valued nonuniformity, uncertainty and
slowness in getting major legalization questions settled.").
117. 601 F.2d 459, 467 (9th Cir. 1979).
118. 548 F.2d 37 (2nd Cir. 1977).
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appeal and reversal. The agency's decision to apply the Lok interpretation in the
Second Circuit avoids futile appeals, costly to both the agency and to petitioners
seeking relief. We find avoidance of this unnecessary process of appeal to be a
sound and rational basis for the agency's action.1 9
To summarize, the INS engages, to some degree, in all forms of nonacqui-
escence. The prevalence of INS intercircuit nonacquiescence, while theoreti-
cally not objectionable," presents serious practical concerns for litigants and
for the courts. Because the Supreme Court actually resolves very few inter-
circuit conflicts, there is a high likelihood of disuniformity t2 t In addition,
intracircuit nonacquiescence, both venue certain and uncertain, raises basic
concerns which should be addressed by Congress.
III. RECENTLY PROPOSED AND POTENTIAL LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
Although Congress has never turned its attention to INS nonacquiescence,
considerable efforts have been made with regard to the Social Security Admin-
istration. The lessons that can be drawn from examining the response to the
SSA are also applicable to a study of INS nonacquiescence, since both involve
comparable legal and policy issues.122 In 1984, both the House and Senate
passed SSA reform legislation, including provisions aimed at prohibiting or
controlling SSA nonacquiescence.It 3 Nevertheless, these provisions were not
incorporated into the final legislation 2 4 because the House and Senate Con-
ference Committee felt "the legal and Constitutional issues raised by nonacqui-
escence can only be settled by the Supreme Court."" Whereas Congress
may be unwilling, it has been suggested that the courts are not particularly well
suited to combatting nonacquiescence. 2 6 As one commentator has written,
"[iln the final analysis, courts are reluctant and basically ill-equipped to use
119. Castillo-Felix, 601 F.2d at 467 (emphasis added).
120. Intercircuit nonacquiescence is presumably merely a way of facilitating circuit dialogue which
eventually results in a consensus or definitive Supreme Court decision, See supra text accompanying notes
50-51.
121. See infra text accompanying notes 141-42.
122. In fact, the discussion of INS nonacquiescence pros and cons, see supra part I.C and accompany-
ing sources, is based in large part on similar analyses of SSA nonacquiescence.
123. H.R. 3755, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 302, 130 CoNG. REC. H1990-91 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1984);
S. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 7, 130 CONG. REc. S.6204 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1984). For an overview
of these bills, see Kubitshek, supra note 2; Froelich, supra note 53, at 164-66.
124. Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460, 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 98 Stat. 1794 (codified generally at 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, 1381).
125. H.R. REP. No. 1039, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 38 (1984).
126. Circuit-wide injunctive relief is possible. See Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986);
Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1983). But as some observers note, these cases are "presently
conducted on a plane of warring absolutism, which deflects careful consideration of the respective roles
of agency and reviewing court." Estreicher & Revesz, Federal Agencies, supra note 1, at 761. See also
Maranville, supra note 1, at 488-90 ("A series of direct challenges to nonacquiescence have been filed...
but the question has not been definitively resolved.") In any case, it is at least clear in the immigration
context that the courts have been reluctant to take any action. See cases cited supra notes 90-95, 116-117.
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sanctions against other branches of government or against government minions
authorized to implement questionable policies. "127
The discussion below examines the contributions that the renewed efforts
by Congress in 1990 and the recommendations of the blue-ribbon Federal
Courts Study Committee (FCSC) can make towards a legislative response to
INS nonacquiescence. However, the central point here is not to craft compre-
hensive legislation but to suggest that it is necessary for Congress to provide
some response. 2 ' Unstructured and unregulated nonacquiescence should not
remain the status quo. Rather, the conflict that nonacquiescence embodies,
namely the balancing of administrative efficiency and justice values, should
be resolved by Congress in a manner sensitive to both court and agency.
A. The Social Security Justice Act of 1990
To combat the "contemptuous behavior" of SSA nonacquiescence, Repre-
sentatives Austin J. Murphy, Jack Brooks and Robert W. Kastenmeier intro-
duced the Social Security Justice Act of 1990 (Act). 129 According to these
sponsors, the Act would "protect[ ] all our constituents from unfair procedures,
and reestablish[ ] the rule of law against unfair regulatory practices.""'
More specifically, the bill proposed to require intracircuit acquiescence unless
the case was being appealed to the Supreme Court.' Furthermore, the bill
required the SSA to request the Solicitor General to file a petition for certiorari
whenever it was unsuccessful in two circuits on the same question of law.
32
Finally, nationwide acquiescence was mandated upon failure to obtain Supreme
Court review in a given case. 33
The proposed Act was overly restrictive of administrative agency litigation
practices in at least two ways. First, it would force an agency to appeal the
127. Austin J. Murphy, When the Government Ignores the Law: Relitigation, Nonacquiescence &
Contempt Are Orwellian Doublespeak for Consequences that Are Deadly, JUDGEs' J., Summer 1990, at
2,5.
128. The main focus of this part is not on statutory details because, given Congress' reluctance to
address the much more notorious SSA nonacquiescence, a law aimed at the INS is not a realistic expecta-
tion. Instead, broader suggestions concerning the thrust and basic provisions of a statute relating to
administrative nonacquiescence are more appropriate.
129. 136 CONG. REc. E1481-02 (daily ed. May 10, 1990) (statement of Rep. Brooks). The Act grew
out of a Federal Courts Study Committee recommendation, see infra notes 137-47 and accompanying text,
but is more detailed and contains additional features. Telephone Interview with Mike Johns, Legislative
Assistant to Congressman Murphy (Mar. 6, 1991) [hereinafter Johns Interview].
130. H.R. 4797, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.; 136 CONG. REC. E1481-02 (daily ed. May 10, 1990)
(statement of Rep. Brooks).
131. Id. This provision would effectively require the SSA either to appeal a decision adverse to its
position or to acquiesce within the circuit producing the adverse opinion. The option of not appealing, yet
continuing to adhere to its position, would be eliminated.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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first adverse circuit decision or face immediate disuniformity of administra-
tion.'34 Second, and equally important, it placed far too much weight on the
discretion of the Solicitor General to seek review and the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari. The massive number of petitions for certiorari, combined with
the Supreme Court's limited resources, eliminates the likelihood that many,
or even a substantial minority of, important and controversial administrative
law cases will be adjudicated in any given year.
35
In any event, the Act was never adopted by Congress, which once again
opted not to pass legislation on nonacquiescence1 36 This choice not to re-
solve nonacquiescence issues was unfortunate. While the Act's balancing may
have been excessively unfavorable to the SSA, it did provide a vehicle by
which the Congress could debate and arrive at a reasonable compromise.
B. Federal Courts Study Committee (FCSC) Recommendations
On SSA intracircuit nonacquiescence, the FCSC 137 was similarly severe.
Citing the "unnecessary tension" between the executive and judicial branches
created by nonacquiescence, the FCSC unanimously recommended mandatory
SSA intracircuit acquiescence. 3  The only exemption allowed was where a
case had been designated by the Solicitor General to be a "test case" and final
judgment had not been reached.139 Again, this proposal, while restrictive,
was beneficial in that it directed the attention of Congress to the issue. In fact,
the FCSC also advised Congress to "explore whether 'non-acquiescence'
policies in other federal branch agencies are in need of legislative control. ""4
A more interesting recommendation Was aimed at the broad problem of
intercircuit conflicts. Researchers for the FCSC found that the steady rise in
appeals had caused Supreme Court review of federal appeals to fall from 7.4%
in 1900, 6.2% in 1915, 2.9% in 1950, 1.0% in 1970 to an estimated 0.4%
134. More generally, all the arguments proffered in support of intracircuit nonacquiescence, see supra
notes 59-73 and accompanying text, are rejected. Intercircuit dialogue would be limited, the agency would
face severe administrative costs and most crucially, the agency would be treated as absolutely inferior to
the circuit court in developing national law. In addition, the Act gives short shrift to the practical factors
that enter into an agency's decision to appeal. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
135. See infra text accompanying notes 141-42.
136. The bill was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means during the 101st Congress and a
decision has not been made on whether to reintroduce during this Congress. Johns Interview, supra note
129.
137. Congress enacted the Federal Courts Study Act in 1988 which mandated the creation of the
FCSC. Pub. L. No. 100-702, Title I, 102 Stat. 4642, 4644 (1988). Chief Justice Rehnquist appointed the
members of the FCSC, a group of 15 distinguished judges, Congressmen and practitioners, who conducted
a fifteen-month study to respond to "mounting public and professional concern with the federal courts'
congestion, delay, expense, and expansion." See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMTTEE 3, 193-96 (1990) [hereinafter FCSC REPORT].
138. Id. at 59-60.




Nonacquiescence in Immigration Decisions
in 1989.41 In addition, they estimated that between sixty and eighty inter-
circuit conflicts remained unresolved by the Supreme Court in 1988 alone. 42
The result was that
the Supreme Court's ability to influence and control the system, by itself deciding
most all of the important precedential cases, has diminished. Many of those cases
are instead now decided finally by one of the circuit courts of appeals ...
[T]here can be no question that the law-declaring functions of the courts of appeals
vis-a-vis the Supreme Court have grown enormously.' 43
Therefore, the FCSC recognized that the federal judicial system "must be
able within a reasonable time to provide a nationally binding construction of
these acts of Congress needing a single, unified construction in order to serve
their purpose."' It first proposed that Congress study the number and fre-
quency of unresolved intercircuit conflicts with particular emphasis on issues
including venue choice provisions and nonacquiescence.' 45 Second, the FCSC
suggested a five-year, experimental pilot project in which the Supreme Court
could choose to refer intercircuit conflicts to an en banc court of appeals for
disposition and enunciation of a national precedent.'" The reviewing circuit
would be randomly chosen from among the circuits not party to the conflict
and reconsideration would only be available in the Supreme Court. 47
This program offered a workable solution to the problems of unresolved
intercircuit conflicts and long-standing nationwide disuniformity caused by
intercircuit nonacquiescence. Unfortunately, Congress chose not to implement
either the pilot program or the bar on SSA intracircuit nonacquiescence.
141
Agency pressure may have been responsible in part for this result. For exam-
ple, Gwendolyn S. King, Commissioner of SSA, wrote to Representative
Kastenmeier to "urge that Congress exercise the same restraint employed in
1984 and avoid any legislative intervention in an area in which innovative and
responsive administrative action has already been taken.""s
On a positive note, however, Congress did commission a study to address
a number of the same issues discussed in this Article. Congress required the
141. Levin H. Campbell & Denis J. Hauptly, A Preliminary View ofthe Problems That Have Led to
Proposaisfor Change, in 2 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITEE: WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMrrTEE
REPORTS Part In1(A), 3 (1990).
142. Jeffrey Barr, Intercircuit Conflicts: An Overview, in 2 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrrrEE:
WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS Part II(C), 5 (1990).
143. Campbell & Hauptly, supra note 141, at 3-4.
144. FCSC REPORT, supra note 137, at 125.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 125-26. The FCSC also recommended that the Judicial Conference of the United States
monitor the project. Id. at 126.
147. Id. at 126.
148. See Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title
III, 104 Stat. 5089, 5104 (1990).
149. Letter from Gwendolyn S. King, Commissioner of Social Security, to Congressman Robert W.
Kastenmeier (Oct. 31, 1990) (on file with Author). The action to which Commissioner King refers is a
set of regulations which the SSA recently drafted on nonacquiescence. See infra note 157 and accompanying
text.
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Federal Judicial Center to submit by January 1, 1992, a study of intercircuit
conflicts which considers, inter alia, whether such a conflict
(2) encourages forum shopping among circuits;
(3) creates unfairness to litigants in different circuits, as in allowing Federal
benefits in one circuit that are denied in other circuits; or
(4) encourages nonacquiescence by Federal agencies in the holdings of the courts
of appeals for different circuits...."
This may signal a new willingness on the part of Congress to solve issues
underlying administrative agency nonacquiescence.
C. Some Thoughts on a Legislative Solution
The Congressional and FCSC efforts demonstrate that practicable legisla-
tion is conceivable. The following brief discussion suggests a few features of
legislation that could be aimed generally at agency nonacquiescence and more
specifically at the particular situation of the INS. First, a source of intracircuit
nonacquiescence may be eliminated by restricting venue choice provisions. As
discussed above, 5 ' venue choice represents statutorily authorized forum-
shopping which places the Board in a difficult adjudicative position and raises
the distinct likelihood of intracircuit nonacquiescence. In deportation cases,
for example, one possibility would be to limit venue to the circuit in which
the hearing occurred.' 52
Second, as a general matter, intercircuit nonacquiescence should be accept-
ed as part of an agency litigation strategy that seeks eventually to achieve
nationwide uniformity of administration. The problem, of course, is that the
intercircuit conflicts that are created5 3 do not get resolved by the Supreme
Court in a timely fashion. Here, the FCSC's experimental program could be
most beneficial. If the Supreme Court had discretion to decide which conflicts
deserve immediate resolution by review in the Supreme Court or an en banc
court of appeals, it would be able to determine whether more dialogue is
desirable or whether immediate resolution is justified.'54 This solution is both
150. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5104 (1990).
151. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
152. To mitigate the possibility of INS forum-shopping, see Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788,
791 (9th Cir. 1989) (espousing a "general policy of preventing forum shopping by the INS"), the agency
should be required to bring an alien to the district office nearest the point of apprehension for the deporta-
tion hearing. Otherwise, it is conceivable that the INS could transport the alien to a circuit which had
produced rulings favorable to the agency.
153. It is evident from the cases cited supra notes 85-86 that intercircuit conflicts are common in
immigration law.
154. "[T]he Supreme Court's active participation in the experiment will make it possible to find out
whether there are many or only a few conflicts that are both unsuitable for Supreme Court review and
nonetheless deserve national resolution. This is a judgment call which the Court is uniquely suited to
make." FCSC REPORT, supra note 137, at 127.
Vol. 9:430, 1991
Nonacquiescence in Immigration Decisions
responsive to the need of the INS to shoulder its massive administrative
burdens and society's interest in establishing nationwide uniformity. 55
Third, intracircuit nonacquiescence could be addressed by drawing from
both the Act and the FCSC's pilot program. Intracircuit nonacquiescence could
be permitted where the INS claims in good faith that it is seeking further
review of a particular legal issue.156 However, if the INS is unsuccessful in
two circuits on the same question of law, it would be required to request the
Solicitor General to file a petition for certiorari and be subject to an en banc
review process. Thus, under limited circumstances, the agency would be
entitled to maintain its position but the courts would be empowered to act
quickly to limit any undesirable effects of the intracircuit nonacquiescence.
Finally, the INS should establish regulations to govern its nonacquiescence
practice. The SSA recently published just such a set of regulations.157 While
unsatisfactory to some, 158 the regulations at least made the SSA position
explicit and provided a forum for public comment. By self-imposing certain
restrictions, an agency perhaps gains respectability with the courts, and both
litigants and the general public are informed.
Thus, a solution to nonacquiescence should involve Congress, courts and
administrative agencies. This multilateral approach ensures that the relevant
viewpoints are represented and encourages a satisfactory balance between
bureaucratic and rule of law values. With a little luck, the data to be accumu-
lated by the Federal Judicial Center 59 will prompt Congress to initiate this
process.
IV. CONCLUSION
While nonacquiescence is the subject of a great deal of legal scholarship,
there can be little doubt that its significance extends far beyond the pages of
law reviews. In any one of the several forms of nonacquiescence, an individual
litigant is denied the benefit of a legal rule, and in the case of immigration
matters, the consequences can be devastating. This Article has attempted to
155. While concerns exist about any given circuit's expertise in immigration matters, see supra note
51, that should not be a reason to reject the en banc process and deny the circuit an opportunity to gain
expertise.
156. Thus, an agency would not be required, as the Act mandates, to appeal the first adverse decision
or be forced to acquiesce nationwide. Instead, the agency could choose to appeal a different case which
presents the same legal question. Evidence of good faith could be supplied, for example, by a request that
the Solicitor General assist in selecting a proper vehicle for review. Given the previously identified costs
of intracircuit nonacquiescence, see supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text, the standards here should
be strict.
157. 20 C.F.R. § 404.985 (1990).
158. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 127, at 4 ("crabbed and contemptuous" regulations).
159. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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describe the phenomenon of nonacquiescence in immigration law and suggest
the contours of a permissible nonacquiescence policy.
In concluding, it is important to recognize the broader implications of the
nonacquiescence debate in the immigration context. Immigration issues pose
the most basic questions of societal identity. Immigration law is, after all, the
method by which we decide who may become part of our nation. The respon-
sibility for adjudicating what the law is falls ultimately on the courts, while
the duty of efficiently executing a far-reaching and complicated statute lies with
the INS. Nonacquiescence embodies the conflicts that arise between the two
institutions. While it is indisputable that both the courts and the INS have a
role to play in developing immigration law, it remains unclear how best to
balance their equally critical mandates. How the conflict is resolved will
determine in large measure the relative power of court and administrative
agency, the manner in which immigration laws will be interpreted and applied,
and ultimately, the make-up of American society.
